Background There is emerging evidence indicating that distractions in the operating room (OR) are prevalent. Studies have shown a negative impact of distractions, but they have been conducted mostly with residents in simulated environments. We tested the hypothesis that intraoperative distractions are associated with deterioration in patient safety checks in the OR. Methods We assessed 24 elective urologic procedures. Blinded trained assessors (two surgeons, one psychologist) used validated instruments to prospectively assess in vivo frequency and severity of distractions (related to communication, phones/pagers, equipment/provisions, OR environment, other hospital departments, or a member of the OR team) and completion of safety-related tasks (related to the patient, equipment, and communication). Descriptive and correlational analyses were conducted. Results Mean case duration was 70 min (mean intraoperative time 31 min). A mean of 4.0 communication distractions (range 0-9) and 2.48 other distractions (range 0-5) were recorded per case (distraction rate of one per 10 min). Distractions from external visitors (addressed to the entire team or the surgeon) and distractions due to lack of coordination between hospital departments were most disruptive. Regarding safety checks, patient tasks were completed most often (85-100 %) followed by equipment tasks (75-100 %) and communication tasks (55-90 %). Correlational analyses showed that more frequent/severe communication distractions were linked to lower completion of patient checks intraoperatively (median rho -0.56, p \ 0.05). Conclusions Distractions are prevalent in ORs and in this study were linked to deterioration in intraoperative patient safety checks. Surgeons should be mindful of their tolerance to distractions. Surgical leadership can help control distractions and reduce their potential impact on patient safety and performance.
Introduction
The issue of distractions and interruptions during clinical work has been receiving increased attention in the surgical and wider health care literature [1, 2] . Existing evidence shows that being distracted can have a range of negative consequences [3, 4] , including a higher chance of error (e.g., when administering medication, carrying out a surgical procedure), increased workload if the distractions are continuous, and inefficient care delivery (i.e., time wasting) [3, 4] .
A number of studies have attempted to measure distractions in surgical work and their impact on surgeons' performance and patient safety. Distractions/interruptions in the operating room (OR) have been quantified [5, 6] . In previous research carried out by our group, we found that 14 distractions occurred within an average intraoperative duration of 56 min (open and laparoscopic elective general surgery cases) [6] . In the same set of cases, we found 3.5 distractions specifically relating to communication (e.g., an external person walking into the OR to discuss another patient with the surgeon) [7] . Similar findings have been reported in urology [8, 9] , laparoscopic antireflux surgery [10] , and cardiothoracic surgery [11] .
Although interest in distractions stems from concerns about patient safety and performance detriments for surgeons, links between distractions and performance in the field of surgery remain to be firmly established. One cardiothoracic study found that a higher rate of distractions was linked to OR team errors [11] , but the rest of the evidence base comes from simulated environments and typically junior surgeons (residents). Such studies have shown that residents' technical performance is negatively affected by distractions [12] [13] [14] , including loud music [15] .
This study examined the impact of intraoperative distractions on patient safety during elective procedures carried out by an experienced (Attending) surgeon. We therefore tested the hypothesis that ''intraoperative distractions are associated with deterioration in patient safety checks during a procedure.''
Methods

Design and case sample
This was a prospective observational study, which included 24 operations. Data were collected from the urology OR of an inner city (London, UK) teaching hospital. To ensure homogeneity in the cases, the same Attending surgeon performed all operations with assistance by a resident and the presence of an Attending anesthesiologist and senior OR nursing personnel. The anesthesia and nursing personnel came from the same ''pool'' across all procedures. Also, the OR personnel had ample experience of working together. Prior to data collection, the study was approved as a service quality improvement project. Informed consent was obtained from all OR team members.
Outcome measures
Distractions
Distractions were assessed via in vivo observation in the OR using an instrument that we previously developed and validated [6] [7] [8] [9] . A distraction was defined as ''any event that occurs intraoperatively and that is not directly related to the care of the patient who is on the operating table at the time.'' The definition is based on psychological theory of task performance-specifically ''task switching'' [16] . Task switching occurs each time a human operator who is engaged in a primary task is faced with a secondary task.
For example, a driver's primary task is driving a car. Dealing with a cell phone ringing in the car becomes a secondary task. Likewise, a surgeon's primary task during a cholecystectomy is dissecting around Calot's triangle. Dealing with a colleague coming into the OR to ask a question is a secondary task. The task-switching literature shows that secondary tasks can divert attention from the primary task and thus negatively affect performance [16] .
Sources of distractions were coded as follows [6] [7] [8] [9] .
- Each observed distraction was rated for its visible severity on an anchored scale of 1 to 9, where 1 is a potentially distracting event and 9 is interrupted flow of the operation (see Table 5 in Appendix).
Patient safety checks
Patient safety was assessed via in vivo observation using a checklist that was developed and validated for use in general and urologic surgery [17] . The checklist covers all phases of an operation (preoperatively, intraoperatively, and immediately postoperatively). It is based on existing OR protocols, recommendations for good practice, and expert input. All tasks on the checklist are deemed important contributors to patient safety in the OR. There are three categories of tasks in the checklist (a revised and further validated version of the checklist was reported by Russ et al. [18] and is available upon request).
• Patient tasks: Actions or information associated directly with the patient (e.g., safe transfer to operating table, patient notes available in OR, patient's condition monitored by anesthesiologist).
• Equipment tasks: Checking and counting surgical instruments, having equipment available and correctly set (e.g., diathermy), having swabs and sharps organized and ready, among others.
• Communication tasks: Confirmation of operative site laterality, surgeon asking team if it is OK to start, surgeon offering clear instruction to scrub practitioner on instruments, among others.
Each item on the checklist was marked ''done'' or ''not done.''
Study procedure
Observations were carried out at the preoperative phase (patient arriving at the anesthesia room to patient being rolled into the OR), intraoperative phase (skin incision to skin closure), and postoperative phase (anesthesia reversal to patient being handed over to the recovery room/team).
Training phase
A senior psychologist (N.S.) was responsible for observing the distractions. The patient safety checklist was completed by either of two surgical residents (J.McD., J.G.). To ensure reliability and accuracy in the assessments, the following steps were taken.
-The psychologist assessor (N.S.) was one of the expert developers of the distractions instrument [6, 7] . Prior to data collection, the senior psychologist and a second blinded surgeon assessor (S.U.) observed five procedures to ensure reliability (which was achieved-same distractions noted, no rating differed by more than 1 point on the 9-point scale). -The two surgeon assessors (J.McD., J.G.) were trained (during five procedures prior to data collection) in the use of the patient safety checklist by a surgeon (S.U.), who developed the checklist [17] .
Interassessor reliability (i.e., agreement at C70 % of the observations) was thus ensured for both the distractions and the patient safety checklist assessments prior to data collection [19] . The additional benefit of this training phase was to allow OR team members to get used to the presence of observers-and thus minimize potential for the Hawthorne effect (i.e., OR personnel changing their behavior because they are being observed).
Data collection phase
Formal data collection was initiated when the training phase was completed. For data collection, one surgeon (J.McD. or J.G.) and the psychologist were simultaneously present in the OR and carried out assessments of safety checks and distractions, respectively. Assessors were fully blinded to each other's proformas/scoring throughout the study.
Statistical analyses
Data were analyzed using SPSS version 18.0 software (SPSS, Chicago, IL, USA). Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations for scale scores; percentages and ranges for frequency data) were computed. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried out to determine which distractions were rated as most severe, their sources, and which team member they affected most. Correlational analyses were carried out (Spearman's rho correlations) to determine relations between distractions and completeness of the patient safety checklist. Significance was set at p \ 0.05.
Results
Case sample
Of the 24 operations, 5 were used to train assessors. Hence, full data sets were available from 19 procedures. The mean procedure duration was 70 min. The intraoperative phase lasted a mean 31 min. Assessed cases included cystoscopies (rigid and flexible), circumcisions, epididymal cyst excisions, stent removals, bladder/prostate biopsies, examinations under anesthesia, transurethral resections of the prostate, transurethral resections of bladder tumors, and cystolitholapaxies.
Patient safety tasks and checks Table 1 summarizes the task completion rates for the three operative phases and the three types of task that the OR team carries out (patient, equipment, communication tasks). Patient tasks were completed more often than other tasks (minimum completion rate of 85 %), communication tasks were least likely to be completed, and tasks relating to OR equipment were in between. Significant variation was observed across procedures in terms of the proportion of tasks carried out by the OR team: task completion ranged from 100 % (all done) to 0 % (none done). ANOVA on the recipients of the distractions revealed that distracting communication received by the surgeons or the entire OR team were statistically the most distracting [F(3, 81) = 3.91, p \ 0.05]. These communications often required the surgeon to stop the procedure, look up (literally) and address the query or comment-hence the high level of disruption. Table 3 summarizes the frequency and rated severity of distractions that were not related to communication. Most of these events were related to equipment and provisionse.g. malfunction of the endoscopic stack or camera system. The most likely recipient of these distractions was the entire OR team-so that the entire team had to take action to address them. Regarding severity, an ANOVA on the sources of these distractions revealed significant differences [F(6, 45) = 3.92, p \ 0.01]-lack of coordination with other hospital departments was the most disruptive problem. Examples included the OR team finding out that a patient scheduled for surgery on the day had just been fed in the ward and thus the list should be changed or the OR team having to re-order the list because the laser equipment that was required for the OR was not available for at least 2 h because of scheduling confusion. An ANOVA on the recipients of these distractions revealed that distractions Entries are frequencies of distracting communications and their observer-rated severity on a 1-9 scale (1 = potentially distracting event, 9 = operation flow interrupted). On nine occasions the source was unclear, and these instances were excluded from the table Entries are frequencies of distracting events excluding distracting communications and their observer-rated severity on a 1-9 scale (1 = potentially distracting event, 9 = operation flow interrupted). On two occasions the source was unclear, and these instances were excluded from the Correlations between distractions and patient safety check completion
Correlational analyses between checklist completion rates and distractions (Table 4) showed significant negative associations between intraoperative communication distractions and patient tasks (e.g., patient's condition monitored by the anesthesiologist, blood/fluids monitored by the OR team). These data support our hypothesis that ''more intraoperative distracting communications were associated with deterioration of patient safety checks.''
Discussion
We aimed to investigate in detail, using validated instruments, the presence and potential impact of distracting events during elective procedures carried out by an experienced surgeon. The present study extends the evidence base on surgical distractions [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] . There were three main findings: (1) We replicated the finding that distractions in the OR are frequent and can be severe. (2) Safety checks in the OR can be variable. (3) Distractions were linked to fewer safety checks being carried out. Numerous distractions were found relating to communications between OR team members or between the team and visitors. There were also distractions unrelated to communication but related to equipment or the layout of the OR itself. Overall, a rate of one distraction per 10 min was recorded. There are currently no absolute criteria regarding what constitutes an unacceptable level of distraction. In fact, distractions are likely to depend heavily on the level of expertise of the surgeon (and the rest of the OR team) and the complexity of the procedure. Residents' performance on simulators is negatively affected by distractions [12] [13] [14] [15] . Recent evidence shows that novice surgeons are more stressed and their performance suffers more as a result of distractions compared to more experienced surgeons [20, 21] . Well-coordinated teams that are supportive of the surgeon can be aware of distractions and minimize them (e.g., a senior OR nurse taking nonurgent calls to the operating surgeon during the critical part of a procedure). We further propose that surgeons actively handle distractions in their ORs to protect their own performance (e.g., trainees should ask the team to switch off the radio while they are operating).
We found that safety checks were highly completed for patient tasks (85-100 %), slightly less so for equipment tasks (75-100 %), and were more variable for communication tasks (55-90 %). Again, there are no absolute standards, but given that the task checklist we used is based on OR protocols and expert input we take the view that completion rates for such tasks should be consistently high. Effective team performance requires consistency, which in turn ensures that the team output is consistently good. To help OR teams become more aware of these tasks, we recently developed a shorter version of the checklist for easier use in ORs [18] .
An important finding of the study was that more distractions of the team intraoperatively were linked to fewer safety checks being carried out by them. This is a novel finding as the study was carried out in real ORs and involved experienced teams. All procedures were carried out by an Attending surgeon, with the presence of an Attending anesthesiologist in the OR and at least one experienced OR nurse on the team (typically, at least two of the nurses were experienced). This means that checks may be omitted even by experienced teams. Although this pattern may not cause concern in elective, fairly straightforward procedures, getting used to such an environment can gradually erode safety standards. If distractions are the daily reality in the OR, then the surgeon learns to ''live with them''-but this does not address the potential threats This study has limitations. They include a small sample size, single institution and speciality, simple procedures included, and lack of a direct assessment of patient outcomes (which would have required significantly more observations). These limitations should be addressed in future studies. There is also a potential observation bias in our data in the form of a Hawthorne effect. This is a limitation shared by all observational studies. Although we could not eliminate it, we allowed a familiarization period prior to data collection, such that OR teams became accustomed to the observers. Finally, there is a limitation to assessing distractions via observation: Although the study is informed by the cognitive psychology of primary versus secondary task performance, certain tasks are inherent in how an OR works in real time (e.g., teaching residents or students, managing a changing list throughout the day). Thus, it is difficult for an observer to estimate their ''true'' impact. It is more easily done in simulation studies, where objective performance indices are available [12] [13] [14] [15] . This situation is a trade-off between the more controllable but more ''artificial'' simulation laboratory and the less controllable but real OR. In fact, the two types of study are complementary. Our study also has significant strengths, which include real-time assessment of expert OR teams, validated assessment tools, and multidisciplinary trained and blinded assessors (surgeons, psychologist).
These findings have implications regarding how to improve surgeons' working conditions in ORs. Our approach was to feed back our findings to the OR teams involved (Attendings and trainees). Their reactions were that (1) they had been unaware of the level of distraction in their ORs (they all thought it was excessive) and (2) unnecessary distractions should be minimized. The teams identified a number of actions. The main one was in relation to coordination between the OR and other hospital departments as this was a key cause of major disruption to their lists.
Following this experience, we recommend that such studies be conducted as part of ongoing safety and quality improvement projects locally tailored to particular ORs. Such studies would include assessment of working conditions, including distractions, over a period of time, followed by anonymized feedback to the teams involved, identification of actions to be taken, implementation of the actions, and reassessment. A range of scientific and usable instruments to assess OR working now exist, including the tools reported here, the Observational Teamwork Assessment for Surgery, OTAS (which captures how well a team works) [23] , and the Surgery Task Load Index, SURG-TLX (which captures the workload) [24] . Interventions also exist, some of which can be implemented without significant costs (e.g., pre-list team briefings and the ''sterile OR'' concept, which involves team members avoiding nonessential talk during safety-critical parts of a procedure to allow the surgeon to focus). Future research should identify principles of optimal work process design in the OR such that unnecessary distractions are kept to a minimum. Such a design would enhance surgeons' performance and patients' safety. Table 5 Distractions rating scale [6, 7] Rating level Observable effect (for assessor to rate) 
